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Abstract 
This paper represents a continuation of a previous paper, Mutaşcu & Dima (2005), where 
we demonstrated the “abnormal” behavior that local authority from Romania is manifesting 
regarding the subventions received from the central budget. In accord with public choice 
theory, exist an “affinity” of a social group - local communities in this case - for a certain 
political party or political coalition, in which case can expect that the distribution of public 
funds, having the nature of transfers given by the central budget to local budgets, to be 
impregnated with a considerable “political color”. This paper is trying to establish, in 
Romania, quantitative and qualitative, the modality of distributing the central public funds 
to local authorities under the political impact. 
 
This paper represents a continuation of a previous paper1 where we demonstrated the 
“abnormal” behavior that local authority from Romania is manifesting regarding the 
subventions received from the central budget. The outstanding representatives of the 
American School of Public Choice, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock or Geoffrey 
Brennan, argue that at the base of establishing allocation criteria of the transfers are not 
only social and economic criteria, but also pure political factors. According to this, the
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 Mutaşcu Mihai, Dima Bogdan, Politics and Interjurisdictional Transfers: the Romanian Case, The impact 
of european integration on the national economy, Ed. Risoprint, Cluj-Napoca, Octombrie, 2005. 
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budgetary transfers given to the local authorities can represent some true “rewards” for 
the communities that have sustained, are sustaining or will sustain the political demarche 
of the forces that have the power. 
If we suppose that there is a relation between the transfers given by the central to 
the local authorities and the political sphere, a challenging question arises: how we can 
identify, characterize and quantified a linkage like this. In Romania’s case it has been 
noticed that in the period before the elections, the fiscal policies were accompanied by 
several important changes at the level of repartition of public funds, by the reduction of 
the fiscal and growths of the public charges, especially of those whit a social character. 
In accord with public choice theory, we can suppose that there is an “affinity” of a 
social group - local communities in this case - for a certain political party or political 
coalition, in which case can expect that the distribution of public funds, having the 
nature of transfers given by the central budget to local budgets, to be impregnated with a 
considerable “political color”. 
This paper is trying to establish, in Romania, quantitative and qualitative, the 
modality of distributing the central public funds to local authorities under the political 
impact. For determining the “affinity” of a local community for the political party or 
political coalition that holds the power, we propose the construction of an “index of 
proximity to power”, obtained on the base of number of votes received by that party in a 
local community. 
The index takes this shape: 
 
 votesofnumber    Total
votes  favorable ofNumber  I =                                          (1) 
 
where: 
- “Number of favorable votes” represents the number of favorable votes obtained, in the 
local community chosen, by the party or coalition that holds the power; 
- “Total number of votes” represents the total number of votes, valid expressed in that 
local community. 
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We can notice that the index takes values between 0 and 1. If the index value is 1, 
we can conclude that there’s a maxim affinity, and if the index is 0, we have a null 
affinity. So, the proximity to power is greater if it is closer to 1. 
In Romania’s case, there have been picked and treated two annual statistical 
series, on the interval between 1993 and 2006, corresponding to the eight regions of 
development (R1 - North - east, R2 - South - east, R3 - South, R4 - South - west, R5 - 
West, R6 - North - west, R7 - Center, R8 - Bucharest), representing the “index of 
proximity to power” (I), and the level of local transfers (T). 
To establish the level of the “index of proximity to power” we used the results of 
the Parliament elections from the 27th of September 1992, the 3rd of November 1996, the 
3rd, 26th November 2000 and 28th November 2004, putting accent on the percent 
obtained, at the level of each county, by the winning party in elections. Because the 
Parliament of Romania is bicameral, to obtain the final global value for the entire 
Parliament, we used an arithmetical average of the two indexes corresponding to the two 
chambers of the Parliament. 
Even if the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have slightly different 
attributions, so we can’t consider them equals from this point of view, we have used the 
arithmetical average for the index, because the majority of the people don’t notice the 
difference between the two chambers, and for them they have approximately the same 
importance. For obtaining statistical series, that can be correlated whit the regional level 
of subventions, we have gather around the counties from the eight regions of 
development from Romania, establishing for each region a value of the “index of 
proximity to power” as a arithmetical average of the values of the index corresponding 
to each county from the considered region. Further on, this value is considered to be 
constant for each of the four years afferent to the period.  
For the study of the linkage “local transfers- politic” we have chose the method of 
the econometrical analysis, conceiving a “Pool Date”2 regressive model with this shape: 
                                                 
2
 For econometric model we are use the econometric software Eviews 5.0. 
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Ani/Regiune IR1 IR2 IR3 IR4 IR5 IR6 IR7 IR8 TR1 TR2 TR3 TR4 TR5 TR6 TR7 TR8
U.M
1993 0.428 0.395 0.413 0.408 0.267 0.159 0.139 0.280 36.7 37.3 27.9 26.0 31.4 29.5 31.2 108.2
1994 0.428 0.395 0.413 0.408 0.267 0.159 0.139 0.280 92.3 82.6 67.0 54.3 72.5 74.2 73.0 246.6
1995 0.428 0.395 0.413 0.408 0.267 0.159 0.139 0.280 150.6 129.5 118.3 90.8 110.9 121.6 112.0 366.1
1996 0.428 0.395 0.413 0.408 0.267 0.159 0.139 0.280 241.0 216.3 191.4 141.1 164.2 192.4 179.2 522.8
1997 0.286 0.342 0.332 0.324 0.347 0.293 0.229 0.472 486.9 432.3 370.4 266.7 339.0 376.9 387.1 1131.0
1998 0.286 0.342 0.332 0.324 0.347 0.293 0.229 0.472 657.0 564.7 524.6 344.8 459.2 493.2 513.0 1498.1
1999 0.286 0.342 0.332 0.324 0.347 0.293 0.229 0.472 353.6 248.2 139.8 81.9 159.0 205.5 192.9 183.1
2000 0.286 0.342 0.332 0.324 0.347 0.293 0.229 0.472 301.7 307.0 201.3 114.3 182.1 271.4 163.7 207.2
2001 0.527 0.463 0.493 0.527 0.387 0.248 0.234 0.401 813.7 570.0 560.7 340.6 494.3 612.9 454.5 507.7
2002 0.527 0.463 0.493 0.527 0.387 0.248 0.234 0.401 74.1 43.8 83.9 18.6 137.0 118.7 32.5 389.2
2003 0.527 0.463 0.493 0.527 0.387 0.248 0.234 0.401 963.0 880.0 876.0 626.0 621.0 742.0 718.0 1118.0
2004 0.527 0.463 0.493 0.527 0.387 0.248 0.234 0.401 1227.0 1268.0 1342.0 858.0 751.0 963.0 1079.0 853.0
2005 0.238 0.327 0.299 0.261 0.317 0.234 0.215 0.476 178.2 218.5 159.2 106.5 151.5 94.0 125.3 68.9
2006 0.238 0.327 0.299 0.261 0.317 0.234 0.215 0.476 144.9 124.5 140.7 98.2 96.1 136.8 111.6 70.6
IRЄ(0,1) mld.ROL
 
ititit εβxXαY ++=                                                (2) 
 
where Yit represents the dependent variable - T, α free term coefficient, β independent 
variable coefficient, Xit independent variable - I, εit error terms, i cross-sectional units 
observed for dated periods - 8 sections (the number of regions) and t the period of time 
(years 1993-2006). 
 
ititit εβxIαT ++=                                              (3) 
 
Indexes of proximity to power and interjurisdictional transfers in Romania - annual 
regional dates, years 1993-2006 
 
The obtained results after the modeling of the two statistical series are: 
 
Dependent Variable: TR?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 10/15/08   Time: 00:19   
Sample: 1993 2006   
Included observations: 14   
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Cross-sections included: 8   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 112  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     1--IR1 782.5829 126.2992 6.196260 0.0000 
2--IR2 668.6576 115.9355 5.767497 0.0000 
3--IR3 595.0675 117.4942 5.064655 0.0000 
4--IR4 394.3849 76.53993 5.152669 0.0000 
5--IR5 626.8893 86.64446 7.235191 0.0000 
6--IR6 1020.190 163.9574 6.222285 0.0000 
7--IR7 1040.350 192.9440 5.391978 0.0000 
8--IR8 1052.320 241.4431 4.358461 0.0000 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.414118     Mean dependent var 0.098468 
Adjusted R-squared 0.374683     S.D. dependent var 1.244570 
S.E. of regression 0.984168     Sum squared resid 100.7331 
F-statistic 10.50144     Durbin-Watson stat 1.926134 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.083034     Mean dependent var 343.3857 
Sum squared resid 11413729     Durbin-Watson stat 1.529418 
     
     
 
  In the supposed case, the model has the next formal and general representation: 
TR1 = α1 x IR1                                                        (4) 
TR2 = α2 x IR2                                                        (5) 
TR3 = α3 x IR3                                                        (6) 
TR4 = α4 x IR4                                                        (7) 
TR5 = α5 x IR5                                                        (8) 
TR6 = α6 x IR6                                                        (9) 
 TR7 = α7 x IR7                                              (10) 
 TR8 = α8 x IR8                                           (11) 
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As we can observe, the correlation coefficient shows the fact that 41,41% of the 
electors political orientation modifications redound on the level of local transfers, so we 
can conclude that the model is representative. 
TR1 = 782,58 x IR1                                               (12) 
TR2 = 668,65 x IR2                                               (13) 
TR3 = 595,06 x IR3                                               (14) 
TR4 = 394,38 x IR4                                               (15) 
TR5 = 626,88 x IR5                                               (16) 
TR6 = 1.020,18 x  IR6                                           (17) 
TR7 = 1.040,35 x IR7                                           (18) 
TR8 = 1.052,32 x IR8                                           (19) 
Of course, there are a lot of limitations derived from the small size of data used, 
from the absence of other explicative variables and from some statistical properties of 
the residuals errors. Despite these limitations, one can conclude that the model is able to 
enlighten at least partially the correlations between the political „affinity” and the value 
of local transfers and to provide an empirical support for the mentioned theoretical 
framework. 
This survey revealed the fact that between the two elements exists a linkage strong 
enough and the interfering effects of the political on the repartition central public funds 
vary from one region to another, and this fact arise the problem of the justness of the 
repartition mechanism of the public funds to local authorities. The greatest distortion 
effects can be noticed in regions R8 - Bucharest, R7 - Center, R6 – North - West and R1 
– North - East, and we can assume that electorate from that regions is very flexible and 
sensitive on the aspect of given the vote to the forces that hold the power. On contrary, 
on the other regions, the electorate remains political faithful, even if the party or the 
coalition will or will not de power. We can observe in this case, that the „financial 
recompense” is equivalences. 
We can conclude that the purpose of our scientific demarche is not to propose a 
new “model of central public funds”, but only to reveal the fact the actual repartition 
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system of public funds is not working right, mostly due to the political factor, and it’s 
needed to reshape it on new coordinates. 
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